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Introduction 
Ever since its first known usage during the so-called “Jew Bill” 
controversy concerning the naturalization process for English Jews in 
the 1750s, the term Jewish Question has connoted a fairly simple, 
straightforward idea: How should a state craft policies to “properly” 
handle its Jewish population.1 However, its inherent subjectivity and 
the sheer multitude of possibilities ensured that no correspondingly 
simple, straightforward answer to the Jewish Question was offered in 
any country throughout Europe. Mired in centuries-old religious 
strife, constantly shifting boundaries and mounds of legislation, 
Russia's encounter with the Jewish Question stands out as one of the 
most complex— capable of perplexing even its most dedicated and 
knowledgeable scholars. Given this track record of bewilderment, 
historian Simon Dubnow questioned Tsar Alexander III's request for 
the formation of the High Commission for the Study of Existing Laws 
on the Jews in early 1883, which followed two years of heavy anti-
Jewish pogroms centered in southwestern Russia. As a student of 
history, the quick-witted Dubnow recognized that the group better 
 
1  Dov Kulka Otto, “The Felix Posen Bibliographic Project on Antisemitism,” 
The 'Jewish Question' in German Speaking Countries, 1848-1914, A Bibliography, 
last modified 1994, http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/bibkulka.html.  
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known as the Pahlen Commission faced a “Sisyphus task” that 
previous “bureaucratic creations” in Russia had promptly abandoned 
due to the perceived impossibility of the task.2 Despite these well-
documented difficulties, one member of the Pahlen Commission 
singlehandedly drafted an explanation of the Jewish Question that 
belied its perceptions as an endlessly confusing labyrinth of religion 
and policy.  
In his aptly titled The Jewish Question in Russia, member Pavel 
Pavlovich Demidov chronicles the history of the Russian state's 
relations with Jews since the Polish Partitions in the late eighteenth 
century. Spanning about 110 pages, Demidov's 1884 accounting of 
Russian policy includes a cursory overview of the most significant 
laws, general trends in legislation affecting Jews and even his own 
recommendations for resolving this greatly perplexing problem. 
Demidov argues that the only way to improve Jewish-Russian 
relations, alleviate Jewish poverty and bolster the empire's economic 
vitality is to abolish the Pale of Settlement, grant Jews civil and 
residential status equal to other subjects and provide more elementary 
school options for Jewish residents.3 Considering the external 
circumstances—namely the pogroms—swirling about when Demidov 
offered these changes, his recommendations are quite remarkable. 
Surprisingly, other Pahlen Commission members agreed with the 
general thrust these prescriptions. In fact, as Antony Polonsky 
explains, the whole commission proposed to “weaken Jewish 
particularism and exploitation by the gradual removal of exceptional 
2  Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, from the Earliest 
Times Until the Present Day (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 
1916), 337-338.  
3  Pavel Pavlovich Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia (London: Darling 
and Son, 1884), 104. 
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legislation,” affecting the Jews.4 As might be expected, Alexander III 
rejected such recommendations, thereby dismissing four years (1883 
to 1887) of laborious investigation into this crucial issue.5 
Demidov hardly seemed to possess the pedigree for such 
politically radical stances. Part of an established Russian noble 
family, a long-time Russian official and the prince of San-Donato (a 
villa in Florence), Demidov figured to come down squarely on the 
opposite side of the Jewish Question. But in his The Jewish Question 
in Russia Demidov asserts with the utmost frankness a theory about 
the “main principle” underlying Russian legislation concerning Jews. 
He claims that Russian policy sought to acquire “material benefits for 
the State from this race [Jews],'” from its policies affecting Jews in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 6 Deeming this motivating 
impulse as a “narrow utilitarian spirit,” that explicitly dictates Russia's 
Jewish policy, Demidov presents a number of instances in his report 
where the state blatantly admits in the language of its ukases to 
allowing Jews to live in areas outside the Pale of Settlement, enroll 
their children in schools previously barred to them or gain 
employment in once-prohibited industries merely because granting 
“such permission would conduce to the benefit of the natives,” the 
national economy and the government in general.7 
Demidov postulates a fairly conclusive theory about the Jewish 
Question, determining its veracity is—much like the question itself—
replete with potential challenges. Due to the sheer number of possible 
motivations for how and why the Russian government enacted 
legislation resulting in either the restriction of Jewish rights or the 
extension of some newfound privileges, no single incentive could 
 
4  Antony Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia (Portland, Ore.: Littman 
Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010), 12.  
5  Ibid., 13.  
6  Ibid., 40. 
7  Ibid., 41. 
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have guided each and every law the state passed involving the Jews 
from the middle of the eighteenth century to Demidov's publication of 
The Jewish Question in Russia almost 150 years later. Beyond this 
logistical hurdle lies yet another: The relative inaccessibility of 
Russian full-text legislation in English translation. Despite the fact 
that some translated excerpts are available in Demidov's report as well 
as various histories analyzing the Jewish Question in Russia, a 
complete accounting of all these laws is impossible to obtain without 
proficiency in Russian. With that said, this challenge requires the 
historian to cobble together translations of Russian laws from a wide 
variety of sources to achieve the highest level of completeness and 
accuracy. 
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, Demidov raises a 
fascinating point that is worthy of further historical exploration. For 
reasons already detailed above, the question of whether the Russian 
government sought to capitalize on each and every policy regarding 
the Jews remains out of reach. However, with dogged historical 
research and a keen eye it is possible for us to investigate the extent to 
which considerations of economic benefit factored into Russia's 
legislative decisions involving Jews, especially those instances where 
a “certain extension of civil rights was made in favor of the Jews,” to 
secure some sort of advantage for the Russian state.8 The scope of this 
exploration should include a few primary sections: First, an 
examination of Russia's history of pragmatism in policies affecting 
the Jews before the Polish Partitions; second, the extent to which the 
enforcement of nineteenth-century laws such as military conscription 
in Jewish communities and permitting members of certain industries 
to reside outside the Pale of Settlement helped to define the notion of 
Jewish “usefulness” in Russia; and, finally, how the state's Jewish 
legislation impacted relations between Russians and Jews. 
 
 
8  Ibid., 40. 
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Exploring Demidov's rather simple explanation of the Jewish 
Question, reminds the historian once again of the subject matter's 
inherent complexity. While Demidov appears to have provided an 
accurate prescription of the problem, the sheer simplicity of his theory 
practically ensures that it falls short of simultaneously charting the 
reasons why it is correct. Sometime in the eighteenth century, the 
Russian state seems to have encountered a persistent confrontation 
between its traditional religious intolerance—dating far back to its 
Muscovite roots—and the potential for economic expansion through 
cooperation with Jewish merchants, traders and middlemen who 
worked with Poles. At the heart of the matter, religious intolerance—
among other stereotypes such as the constant fear of Jewish 
merchants exploiting peasants or innate Jewish deficiency—prompted 
the state to enact restrictions on where Jews could reside, the 
occupations they were allowed to take up and sundry rights readily 
bestowed upon ‘native’ Russian subjects. Many of these restrictions 
prohibited Jews from participating in the kinds of economic activity 
that had previously proved beneficial to individuals, villages, towns, 
districts and the Russian Empire as a whole. In other circumstances, 
when the Russian government acquired new land or chose to develop 
some unproductive or unsettled part of the empire, they sought Jewish 
assistance in the form of residency, working in understaffed fields or 
the construction of infrastructure projects despite the fact that laws 
often barred Jews from the areas where Jews provided this much-
needed help. In such instances, Russian officials typically repealed the 
restrictive measures on Jews in an effort to reclaim squandered 
economic vitality. For this reason, Demidov is correct in concluding 
that the main principle—but not the only principle—of legislation 
concerning the Jews took the form of granting a relaxation of 
previously established prohibitions with an eye on deriving some 
benefit for the Russian state. 
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Pragmatism in Russian Policy Toward the Jews Leading Up to 
the Polish Partitions 
Beginning in 1772, the Russian Empire continued its westward 
expansion by colluding with Prussia and Austria to control then 
divide the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Known as the Polish 
Partitions, the three Eastern European powers split the region in a 
series of annexations in the years 1772, 1793 and 1795. With these 
partitions came the shifting of enormous populations of Jews—not 
necessarily in physical relocation, but more often in terms of which 
country they would call home. As a result, Russia, an empire that had 
previously banned Jewish residence, had nearly 290,000 Jews in its 
empire, according to estimations of the 1764 Polish census.9 Due to 
the roughness of initial estimates provided in the Polish census and 
natural population growth within the Jewish community, this figure 
expanded with subsequent recalculations. By the close of the 
eighteenth century, most widely cited statistics estimated roughly 
600,000 Jews—or 1.5 percent of the empire's inhabitants—in 
Russia.10 Historian Israel Bartal captures the predicament facing 
Polish-Lithuanian Jewish communities as a result of the partitions: 
“The most striking change caused by the partitions was the opening of 
the Russian empire. A country that, for age-old religious reasons, had 
never permitted Jews to reside in it now had annexed regions 
inhabited by hundreds of thousands of descendants of the 'God 
killers.'”11 
While the Polish Partitions represent the natural starting point for 
Russia's formal handling of the Jewish Question—since Jews actually 
lived within the Russian domain—the beginnings of the sort of 
utilitarian approach Demidov accuses the state of taking with regard 
 
9  Ibid., 322. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Israel Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772-1881 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 34. 
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to the Jews are evident much earlier. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, Russian leaders faced a number of difficult decisions 
concerning whether to rescind previously enacted restrictions on Jews 
in order to boost economic gains. Living in the bordering Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, Jewish merchants developed strong 
trading relationships with their Russian counterparts. Though Russian 
law barred them from residing within the empire, certain provisions 
allowed Jews to commute across the border for weekly markets and 
less frequent fairs that proved beneficial for Jewish and Russian 
merchants alike.12 When Russian legislation against Jews severed, or 
even limited, these interstate trading relationships, petitions and 
complaints from merchants spelling out the potential loss of economic 
profit often persuaded the state to retract the offending laws. In the 
lead up to the Polish Partitions, this same pattern played out time and 
again, placing the Russian state's traditional religious intolerance of 
and general aversion toward Jews in direct conflict with the empire's 
economic interests. 
After the initial partition in 1772, Empress Catherine II assured 
the Jews of White Russia that they would “retain and preserve those 
freedoms that they now enjoy by law regarding the control of their 
property because the humaneness of Her Imperial Majesty will not 
permit anyone to be excluded from Her all-encompassing 
generosity.”13 However, a proclamation delivered by a different 
Catherine—Catherine I—almost a half century earlier in 1727 holds 
equal significance in understanding how the Jewish Question formed 
in Russia. Yielding to reoccurring complaints about Jewish tavern 
keepers and farmers, Catherine I issued a decree in 1727 that expelled 
all Jews from the Ukraine (then a part of the Russian Empire) and any 
other towns in Russia. As Demidov explains, Catherine intended to 
12  John Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the "Jewish Question" 
in Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), 28. 
13  Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 58. 
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ensure that all Jews “shall be immediately expelled beyond the 
frontier and not be allowed under any circumstances to enter 
Russia.”14 Yet, when confronted with a fairly similar amount of 
pressure from Russian merchants on the other side of this debate the 
empress appears to have largely rolled back the restrictions. Despite 
the fact that Catherine I issued an expulsion decree that minced few 
words, when petitions poured into the government from disgruntled 
merchants and officials in various parts of the district, Empress Anna 
finally restored the right for Jews to participate in retail and wholesale 
trade throughout all of Ukraine in 1734.15  
As this example demonstrates, the Russian Empire's economic 
interests had the potential to supersede policies the state had 
established in the spirit of traditional religious intolerance toward the 
Jews. Historian John Klier makes this point when he remarks how 
“pragmatic considerations could temper even Russian intolerance,” on 
religious grounds.16 Considering the persistence of religious hostility 
directed at Jews in Russia, this alone was quite an accomplishment. 
As evidence that these religious sentiments still lingered in 
contemporary Russia, Aleksandr Voznitsyn, a retired naval officer 
who had converted to Judaism, and Borokh Leibov, a Jew from the 
Smolensk district charged with converting him, were both burned at 
the stake for their infractions in St. Petersburg in July 1738.17 Before 
his death Leibov had actually played a leading role in Catherine I's 
aforementioned declaration barring all Jews from Ukraine in 1727. 
While working as a farmer in Smolensk, an important border town for 
moving goods into Russia from Poland, Leibov helped build a 
synagogue for some Jews in the nearby village of Zverovich.18 These 
 
14  Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia, 11. 
15  Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 28. 
16  Ibid., 34. 
17  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 325. 
18  Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 28. 
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actions ignited protests from the local Orthodox clergy that prompted 
Catherine to expel Jews, setting the stage for the showdown between 
traditional religious sentiments and economic gain that resurfaced so 
often during this period. 
Shortly after her ascension to the throne in 1741, Elizabeth, the 
devoutly Orthodox daughter of Peter I, targeted religious minorities in 
the empire—especially Muslims and Jews—by announcing the 
expulsion of “these haters of the name of Christ, the Savior.”19 Once 
again, religious intolerance and economic considerations clashed with 
the execution of this policy. In response to her expulsion order, some 
Riga merchants drafted a petition for the Senate to express their fears 
that such a policy might induce substantial economic ramifications 
due to the “loss of their Jewish middlemen in trade with Poland.”20 
Administrators from Lifland province aired similar concerns, 
complaining to the Senate that "the commerce of Riga may be entirely 
destroyed, and there will be no one to sell the foreign goods 
imported," with Jews expelled from the district.21 However, instead of 
allowing all these claims of severe economic detriment to overwhelm 
her religiously motivated policy, Elizabeth fired back with a well-
known retort when the Senate requested she reconsider: “I desire no 
mercenary profit from the enemies of Christ.”22 Even though 
Elizabeth's seemingly unshakable religious faith ensured that she 
would not deviate from expulsion order, a close reading reveals—
specifically the word “profit”—that she too considered Jews, and 
other religious minorities, an economic boon for Russia. 
Perhaps none of Elizabeth's fellow tsars and tsarinas shared her 
exact obstinacy when it came to the matter of acquiring a “profit” 
from the “enemies of Christ.” Despite retaining her predecessor's ban 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia, 41. 
22  Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 29. 
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on Jewish settlement upon taking the throne in June 1762, Catherine 
II showed a willingness to overlook religious differences when 
seemingly more significant economic and security considerations 
surfaced. Almost immediately after taking control, Catherine issued 
her first of two Imperial Manifestos –one in 1762 and another in 
1763—with the intention of recruiting foreign settlers to populate 
Russian territories in the southern and western parts of the empire.23 
Even before the Polish Partitions, Russia possessed massive amounts 
of excessive land in these regions. In fact, the 1763 Imperial 
Manifesto plainly notes that “a great many…Places for the settlement 
and Habitation of Mankind...remaine (sic) yet uncultivated.”24 While 
underpopulation remained a major concern for Catherine, Roger 
Bartlett explains that Russia's drive for foreign immigration also 
meshed with the “mercantilist and cameralist theories of statecraft 
prominent in Europe in the early and middle decades of the 
century.”25 On a more practical level, Catherine's immigration 
program assisted in the growth of the economy, both from the 
standpoint of general population increase and “specifically through 
the use of immigrants to encourage trade, industry and agriculture.”26 
When Catherine sent the Initial drafts of her 1762 Imperial decree 
to the Senate, she excluded Jews from the ranks of potential foreign 
settlers for Russia's sparsely populated southern and western 
borderlands. Hinting at religious difference, the October 14, 1762 
draft stated: “to receive henceforth into Russia without further report 
to Us all persons wishing to settle, except Jews. We hope in time by 
this means to increase the glory of God and his Orthodox faith, and 
the well-being of Our Empire.”27 The final line perfectly encapsulates 
 
23  Roger P. Bartlett, Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia 
1762-1804 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), xiii.  
24  Ibid., 32.  
25  Ibid., 2.  
26  Ibid., 3. 
27  Ibid., 35.  
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the dilemma facing Russian officials. Most often in regards to the 
Jewish Question, the choice came between maintaining the purity of 
the Orthodox faith within Russia and the “well-being of Our Empire.” 
When Catherine issued a revised Imperial Manifesto a year later, 
mention of Jewish exclusion was curiously missing. This time Jews 
became directly involved in the recruitment process. Some Russian 
immigration officials secretly used Jewish emissaries to recruit Jews 
from Prussia and Poland for districts in New Russia.28 And Russian 
officials seemingly opened the door to any prospective settler, which 
is clear from this circular sent to southern border authorities in 1764: 
“People of any nationality and [religious] observance crossing the 
border with the intention of entering service or settling in the New 
Russia province shall immediately be admitted into the 
aforementioned province. They shall not be asked their nationality, or 
required to produce passports.”29  Looking past the irony of the 
Russian government actively seeking out Jews to settle in particular 
parts of empire—a scenario that would replay itself with far-off 
colonization programs in the nineteenth century—an expulsion decree 
still restricted Jewish residence in most other districts. Nevertheless, 
only eight short years after enacting this rather curious colonization 
policy, Catherine II would sign the first of the Polish Partitions, 
shortly making Russia home to one of the world's largest Jewish 
populations. Catherine perhaps embodies the perfect Russian leader 
for the sort of Jewish policy Demidov articulated. Throughout her 
reign Catherine willingly bent entrenched rules regarding the Jews in 
order to derive an economic or strategic benefit for Russia. Polonsky 
explains this tendency quite well when he argues that “Finance 
conditions—the need to pay for the wars of the eighteenth century and 
 
28  Ibid., 62.  
29  Ibid.  
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the attendant imperial expansion—were also a constant factor in 
determining her policies.”30 
From the relatively short period between Catherine I's expulsion 
decree in 1727 and Catherine II's proclamation of supreme generosity 
toward the Jews in 1772, Russian policy seems to have made some 
fairly substantial shifts in regards to the Jewish Question. Clearly, the 
Russian Empire had not evolved into a completely accepting, 
Enlightenment-minded state in the course of some 45 years. That 
Catherine II set in motion what would become the Pale of Settlement 
less than 20 years after the latter of these two dates assures us that this 
is certainly not the case. What changed then during this period? Most 
significantly, the traditional religious intolerance that had longed 
barred Jews from Russia started to give way to the same sort of 
economic interests Demidov describes in his report. As Bartal 
explains, the two primary problems the Russian state encountered 
following the partitions included how best to integrate the Jews and 
how to organize Jewish economic “activity so that it would be of 
benefit to the state and at the same time not harm the economic 
interests of other groups in the population.”31 While an obvious long-
term concern, religious difference hardly constituted a major issue at 
this time since “the trends of enlightened absolutism were dominant,” 
and the “Jews in Russia were not necessarily perceived according to 
the traditional Christian image but as a population of great economic 
value.”32 
Some decisions the Russian state committed to immediately 
following the Polish Partitions support Demidov's claims about the 
“narrow utilitarian spirit,” that often motivated its policy. Klier offers 
a fascinating suggestion when he questions why Catherine II failed to 
employ the most “Muscovite” approach to the partitions by simply 
30  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 336.  
31  Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 59. 
32  Ibid.  
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expelling all Jews residing in the areas of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth that Russia annexed.33 This approach would have 
jibed best with supreme religious intolerance. However, as Demidov 
suggests, perhaps the Russian state allowed Jews to remain in the 
same provinces they occupied before the partitions, which eventually 
became the Pale of Settlement, in order to derive maximum economic 
benefit from their inclusion in the empire. In another calculating 
maneuver, the Russian state opted to “retain and expand” the Jewish 
autonomous institutions after the first partition.34 Part of the reason 
for this policy is the Russian government feared that administrative 
weaknesses might lead to losses in tax revenue. Lacking the means to 
collect taxes from most Jewish communities, the state had to rely on 
the kahal to gather taxes from the members of its community. In this 
way, the government permitted Jews to preserve their autonomous 
communities (the extension of a right) in exchange for a consistent 
method of tax collection for the Russian state (a valuable economic 
benefit)—a government-initiated tradeoff executed much as Demidov 
suggested. 
Defining Jewish “Usefulness” Through Nineteenth Century Policy 
As Enlightenment ideas gained increasing prevalence in Eastern 
Europe toward the middle of the eighteenth century, the influence of 
powerful notions of the individual recast societal bonds. Now instead 
of large collections of groups, societies were thought to consist of 
individuals who each possessed their rights while also maintaining 
various obligations to the state. As Enlightenment influences reached 
Russia, societal structures and the economic landscape adapted 
accordingly. Adam Teller explains precisely how these larger social 
and economic shifts impacted Jews as they came within the fold of 
the Russian Empire: “The economic component of this ideology—
33  Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 30. 
34  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 332. 
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physiocracy—that valued the natural economy and agricultural work 
above all, viewed Jewish economic activity negatively. It argued that 
in order to make Jews useful members of society, their economic life 
should be reformed to make it more 'productive.' In real terms, this 
meant causing Jews to abandon petty trade in favor of agriculture, or 
at least crafts and industrial labor.”35 Russian officials strove to more 
fully integrate Jews into the empire's economic order while 
simultaneously employing them in those industries considered 
desirable or in demand to secure the greatest boon for the empire’s 
economy. Evidence of such motives is strewn through state legislation 
from Alexander I's Jewish Constitution in 1804 to Alexander II's more 
permissive laws that allowed certain Jews to reside outside the Pale of 
Settlement in the 1860s. 
With the Polish Partitions now complete and a nascent Pale of 
Settlement forming along the western borderlands of the empire, 
Russia's Jewish policy became more focused at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. After the rather short half-decade reign of 
Catherine's son Paul, the empire welcomed a new tsar to the throne in 
1801: Alexander I. For the next quarter century, Alexander would 
orchestrate Russia's efforts to “transform” the Jews into useful and 
productive subjects capable of helping boost the empire's often 
sluggish and unsatisfactory—when compared to Western powers—
economic performance.  Few contemporary Russian officials would 
likely consider the task easy. Jews had acquired several unpleasant 
stereotypes that the Russian government, in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment, hoped it could purge en route to morphing them into 
positive, contributing members of the empire. First, many Russians 
claimed Jews “disrupted relations between landlords and peasants in 
35  Adam Teller, “Economic Life,” YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern 
Europe, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Economic_Life. 
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the sensitive western provinces,” with their “oppressive” behavior.36 
A related accusation that severely complicated the Jewish Question in 
Russia contended that Jews exploited peasants in the countryside, 
prompting much legislation to protect the latter group from these 
devious Jewish traders and tavern keepers. The other perceived hurdle 
to shaping Jews into useful subjects was they supposedly “disdained 
physical labor,” and “felt should be performed by the 'inferior' 
peasant.”37 Despite these potential pitfalls, Russian leaders had a 
“high regard for Jewish commercial acumen,” and believed that, with 
the proper legislation in place, they could represent a useful and 
economically beneficial asset for the empire.38 
Alexander's issuance of the Statute Concerning the Organization 
of the Jews—or, as it is more commonly known, the Jewish 
Constitution—on December 9, 1804 marked a seminal moment in the 
relationship between the Russian state and its Jewish subjects. The 
statute aimed to overhaul Jewish life, delving into areas as far-ranging 
as education, economics, religion and community associations. In this 
way, the Jewish Constitution of 1804 represented the first significant 
attempt on the part of the Russian government to define Jewish 
usefulness. Reacting to complaints from Russian natives about Jews 
working as innkeepers and tavern keepers in the Western provinces, 
Alexander barred all Jews from agriculture-related leasing in article 
34 of the statute in order to “increase the economic benefits they 
provided,” and encourage “Jewish agricultural settlement.”39 
Relatedly, the statute abolished all Jewish leaseholders from the 
villages: “No Jew, beginning on the 1st of January 1808, in the 
provinces of Astrakhan and Caucasia, and in those of Little Russia 
and New Russia, and from the 1st of January 1808, elsewhere, in any 
 
36  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 328. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid., 329. 
39  Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 59. 
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village or in the countryside, is allowed to hold a lease on a tavern, 
drinking house or inn … nor to sell liquor, nor even to live where this 
is done, except when passing through.”40 Despite the specificity 
demonstrated above, the policy remained only partially implemented 
for all practical purposes came to a halt with a Jewish committee 
report in March 1812 that claimed, “Jews performed valuable 
economic functions in the countryside.”41 
At the heart of the Jewish Constitution of 1804, the Russian state 
began to sketch its definition of a useful Jewish subject. Dubnow 
characterizes the government's attempts nicely when he writes that 
from an economic standpoint “the new statute establishes two 
opposite poles,” a “negative pole” that includes “the rural occupations 
of innkeeping and land-tenure” and a “positive pole” that features 
agriculture, “which on the contrary is to be stimulated and promoted 
among Jews in every possible manner.”42 According to the statute's 
provisions, all Jews were placed in one of four economic categories: 
merchants, townspeople, manufacturers and artisans, and farmers. 
Furthermore, the state offered loans to individuals who established 
factories which were “in particular demand” in hopes of spurring 
Jewish enrollment in occupations such as industry, manufacturing and 
artisanry.43 Demidov even cites a ukase from July 29, 1827 that states, 
“the Government measures adopted for deriving State advantages 
from this race by the enactment of the special Regulations of 1804 for 
the administration of the Jews, and the contrivance of means for the 
transfer of Jews from villages to the towns have not as yet been 
attended with the desired success."44 While a number of factors—
including recent events, the intended audience and unknown political 
 
 
40  Ibid., 62. 
41  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 350. 
42  Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, 342.  
43  Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 347. 
44  Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia, 42. 
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circumstances—might ultimately be responsible for the mention of 
“deriving State advantages from this race,” its inclusion remains 
rather curious, and serves as fairly solid evidence that the Russia state 
perceived Jews as a tool for which to derive economic benefit. 
One potentially overlooked factor that demonstrates the 
importance that Alexander I placed on the ability for Jews to 
substantially contribute to the empire's economic vitality is the 
unprecedented amount of attention the tsar devoted to the topic. Prior 
to Alexander establishing the Committee for the Organization of 
Jewish Life in November 1802, no formal body specifically for the 
investigation of Jewish legislation and issues had existed in the tsarist 
empire or Poland. Within the next couple years the government 
formed yet another commission. Then in January 1809 Alexander 
appointed a third Jewish Committee, “with a mandate to examine all 
aspects of the problem of how Jews could be diverted from the rural 
economy and the liquor trade to other economic activities.”45 In 
March 1812, after three years of hard work, the committee released a 
report that argued Jews should be permitted to sell alcohol in the 
countryside (“It is not true that the village Jew enriches himself at the 
expense of the peasant. On the contrary, he is generally poor, and ekes 
out a scanty existence from the sale of liquor...”) and fought 
forcefully against article 34 of the Jewish Constitution of 1804 
banning Jews from leaseholding (“The recent experiments of the 
Government have had no effect. On the contrary, the Jewish people  
'has not only remained in the same state of poverty, but has even been 
reduced to greater destitution, as a result of having been forced out of 
a pursuit which had provided it with a livelihood for several 
centuries.'”).46 With Napoleon's army advancing toward Russia's 
western border, Alexander reasoned that the empire would be better 
off with the Jews remaining in the countryside for now. However, this 
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would not mark the final time a Russian tsar ordered the formation of 
a committee to investigate the Jewish Question. 
While Russian leaders openly expressed their desire to refashion 
Jews into an economically beneficial group in the articles of their 
statutes and decrees, often times the less provocative language 
contained in these documents proves just as valuable for the historian. 
A prime example of this concept is Nicholas I’s Recruitment Statute 
of the Jews issued on August 26, 1827. The statute ordered that “for 
the relief of all Our loyal subjects, the recruitment duty be equalized 
for all categories of subjects liable to it, We order that Jews be 
required to fulfill the recruitment duty in person,” rather than pay a 
500-rouble exemption tax.47 As a militant person who regarded “all 
human life as being nothing more than service because everyone must 
serve,” Nicholas believed the army could cure the ills of Jewish 
society, thus helping Russia solve its problem with Jews and 
cultivating a growing group of useful economic contributors.48 In this 
way, the military would serve as a sort of classroom for the twelve to 
twenty-five year-old Jewish recruits since “they would learn not only 
Russian but also useful skills and crafts, and eventually they would 
become his loyal subjects.”49 However, Nicholas planned to protect a 
select group of individuals from the compulsory twenty-five year 
conscription terms. Aside from rabbis, the other categories of exempt 
Jews possessed some level of economic usefulness, or potential 
economic usefulness, for  the Russian state: members of the merchant 
estate (likely paying hefty taxes and stimulating the economy with 
many financial transactions), Jews who had taken courses in state-
sponsored institutions (learning the language and practical skills the 
47   Michael Stanislawski, Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews (Philadelphia: The 
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983), 16. 
48   Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 359. 
49  Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, “Military Service in Russia,” YIVO 
Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/ 
article.aspx/Military_Service_in_Russia. 
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government desires) and those living on Jewish agricultural colonies 
(which the state wished to develop into productive, lucrative ventures 
in formerly barren districts). Apparently Russia’s definition of Jewish 
usefulness changed little because a couple decades later Alexander II 
would select similar groups for exemption from the Pale of 
Settlement. 
Following the reoccurrence of famine in the former Polish 
provinces in the late 1830s, Nicholas sought new methods to solve the 
Jewish Question. For this purpose, he enlisted the assistance of Pavel 
Kiselev, who was charged with investigating the issue and reporting 
his findings. Kiselev’s recommendations might represent the most 
poignant example of the Russian state’s efforts to define Jewish 
usefulness in the nineteenth century. Kiselev took the opportunity to 
call for a “fundamental transformation of this nation … [by] the 
removal of those harmful factors that obstruct its path to the general 
civil order.”50 Beyond banning separate Jewish dress and setting up 
schools that would teach Russian language and history, Kiselev’s 
program greatly emphasized the importance of Jews taking up the 
sorts of “useful” occupations the Russian state had been encouraging 
them to embrace since Alexander I assumed the throne in 1801.51 Not 
stopping at a mere outline of his proposal to “transform” Russia’s 
Jews, Kiselev offered an execution plan to accelerate the 
“productivization” of the Jews. Based on particular criteria, the 
government would separate Jews into “productive” and “non-
productive” categories. Members of the latter group would have five 
years to establish—by “stable residence through the ownership of 
property or by becoming artisans, farmers, or guild merchants”—their 
case for elevation into the “productive” category. If unsuccessful, 
however, Kiselev’s guidelines dictated that these “non-productive” 
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Jews would be conscripted or forcibly retrained for one of the 
aforementioned occupations. 
Despite its radical nature—and the fiery opposition it touched off 
among Nicholas I’s advisors—Kiselev’s plan served as the basis for 
the Russian state’s reclassification policy adopted in 1846. Much like 
the proposal Kiselev offered, Jews would have to prove themselves as 
useful by joining a merchant guild, owning property in a city or town, 
becoming a member of an artisan guild, or declaring as a farmer—for 
whom the government would subsidize with financial support.52 The 
new law required all Jews to register for their chosen category by 
January 1, 1850, with any Jew who failed to do so liable to “suffer the 
unpleasant consequences which their persistence on the path of evil 
must to.”53 Even though Kiselev’s plan earned the tsar’s blessing, as 
Stanislawski points out, it missed the target because most of the Jews 
who the government sought to improve through the reclassification 
program were too impoverished to cobble together enough money to 
learn a new trade or buy admission into a guild—let alone purchase a 
house in a city or town.54 “The illness of the Jews, their poverty and 
exploitation of the peasants,” Stanislawski argues, “would only be 
exacerbated by crowding them into the big cities without sufficient 
means of support.”55 Thanks in part to the inability of Jews to 
dramatically change their circumstances and the dysfunction common 
to the tsarist bureaucracy, the deadline for Jews to register in the 
categories passed. First it was extended to July 1, 1852 then 
November 1, 1852, but enforcement never came. The combination of 
the Crimean War starting less than a year later in October 1853 plus 
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the Nicholas’s death sixteen months later are often cited as the 
primary reasons for this policy remaining unimplemented.56 
This exact same combination—the Crimean War loss and death 
of Nicholas I—ushered in a series of sweeping changes in the middle 
of the 1850s. By virtue of its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia faced 
mounting debt and the harsh reality of economic and military 
inferiority to stronger Western powers such as Britain and France.57 
Replacing the deceased tsar, the new leader Alexander II sought to 
“narrow the gap between Russia and the European powers,” an 
ambition that would substantially alter Jewish life in the coming 
decades.58 The first domino to fall came with the abolition of serfdom 
in 1861, which rapidly propelled Russia form the depths of an 
agricultural feudal economy toward a primarily capitalistic one. Since 
many Jews still depended on the leasehold system, this sudden change 
constituted a significant shock that forced them to seek other means of 
employment to survive. But the next domino affected Jewish society 
even more directly.  Shortly after becoming tsar, Alexander convened 
the Jewish Committee to review legislation concerning the Jews—a 
common practice for new nineteenth century Russian leaders. When 
the committee canvassed the Pale of Settlement to ask the various 
province governors whether restrictions on Jewish residence and 
occupations should be lessened, many advocated “the immediate 
granting of civil rights to the Jews and allowing them freedom of both 
residence and choice of occupation.”59 Several even highlighted the 
positive national economic ramifications such a policy would have if 
enacted. Unfortunately for the Jews, the Jewish Committee wished for 
a more gradual emancipation process that would assure Jews had 
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“reformed their communal life, acquired Western-style education, and 
become engaged in ‘useful’ occupations.”60 
Following the pattern of previous policies regarding the Jews 
during this period, Alexander’s decision of which Jewish groups 
would first experience eased restrictions weighed heavily on 
economic considerations. To be fair, Russian officials also took into 
account which Jewish groups would least likely clash with peasants, 
but the choices speak for themselves in terms of their potential 
financial attractiveness to the government. Three main groups of Jews 
fit this criterion: merchants of the first guild, university graduates 
(recipients of doctorates, master’s or bachelor’s degrees) and all 
artisans that possessed membership to a guild.61 From March 1859 to 
June 1865, the Russian state relaxed restrictions on the 
aforementioned groups, allowing them to exit the Pale of Settlement 
in search of more enticing opportunities in the interior of the empire. 
Only the artisans—which included craftsmen, mechanics, distillers, 
brewers and others—were forced to follow specific protocols for fear 
they might exploit peasants or become unproductive. With that said, 
artisans had to routinely obtain passports from their hometowns in the 
Pale and return there if they became unemployed.62 Even though this 
policy may have opened the interior for an estimated one-fifth of the 
Jewish population in the Pale, the bureaucratic laws deterred most 
eligible Jews from leaving at this time.63 
Alexander’s policy of exempting a small percentage of the most 
“useful” Jews from the harshness of life in the Pale of Settlement 
serves as the best representation of Demidov’s accusation that the 
Russian state often offered a “certain extension of civil rights [to be] 
60  Ibid., 396. 
61  Ibid., 397. 
62  Ibid. 
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made in favor of the Jews,” in exchange for " the acquisition of 
material benefits for the State from this race.”64 With each major 
piece of major legislation concerning the Jews from Catherine II to 
Nicholas I, the Russian state further defined the Pale of Settlement’s 
boundaries, which effectively sealed its provinces off as bastion of 
economic underperformance and Jewish poverty. Many officials in 
the Russian government believed, like the liberal newspaper Golos 
(The Voice) that the Russian peasantry would “would be ‘eaten alive’ 
by the literate and crafty Jews if the latter were allowed free entry into 
the interior.”65 However, much like the conflict between religious 
intolerance and economic considerations Russian leaders encountered 
before the Polish Partitions in the eighteenth century, when the state 
wished to rectify the well-known “unfavorable comparison between 
Russia and Western Europe in terms of development,” it would draft 
policies allowing the most prosperous, economically beneficial Jews 
to live or conduct business outside the Pale of Settlement.66 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Russian state demonstrated a 
keen interest in the development of Jews into “useful” and 
“productive” subjects who would derive immense economic benefits 
for the state. When the time came to endow Jews with some level of 
emancipation during Alexander II’s attempts to revamp the Russian 
economy, there is little surprise that the first groups to earn the 
privileges of residence and occupation choice perfectly matched the 
state’s long-crafted definition of “usefulness.” 
64  Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia, 40. 
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How the State’s Jewish Legislation Impacted Relations between 
Russians and Jews 
The Russian government’s focus on deriving economic benefits 
from Jews during the period starting in the middle of the eighteenth 
century and ending with Alexander II’s death in 1881 was not 
responsible for the deep schism between native Orthodox Russians 
and Jews. Religious tensions and political squabbles between the two 
groups are thought to date back to the late fifteenth century under the 
rule of Muscovite Russia.67 Therefore Russian policies enacted three 
to four centuries later might have exacerbated existing problems but 
could not reasonably be considered the cause of them. With that said, 
the Russian state perpetuated relations between Jews and non-Jews in 
the empire through its policies in a few significant ways: The 
establishment of the Pale of Settlement increased Jewish separateness 
and the erratic nature of Russia’s Jewish policy made it challenging 
for society to settle around a firm understanding of the Jews within 
the Russian Empire.   
Representations of Jewish deviation from the rest of Russian 
society constituted one of the primary targets of state restrictions 
during the nineteenth century. Whether focusing on autonomous 
organizations, traditional Jewish dress or teachings at Jewish religious 
schools, the general thrust of Russian legislation sought to remove 
these perceived barriers from rest of the population. Sergey Uvarov 
must have considered this part of his motive when he vowed to 
accomplish “a complete transformation of Jewish life” in the early 
1840s.68 At the same time, however, the Russian state used the Pale of 
Settlement as a sort of pen for “unproductive” Jews. Even before 
Alexander II opened the interior up to the Jewish population’s best 
and brightest in the late 1850s and early 1860s, legislation in 1835 
67  Jewish Encylopedia, s.v. "Muscovite Russia," http://www.jewish 
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“permitted only short, temporary sojourns outside the Pale,” for elite 
merchants.69 While Russian leaders rewarded a small handful of Jews, 
the vast majority had no exposure to life outside the Pale of 
Settlement. This lack of face-to-face experience with Russians made 
Jewish stereotypes much more powerful, which may have aided in the 
rise of anti-Semitism in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Louis Greenberg explains the problem: “the Jew as a human being 
was practically an unknown entity to the Russian people. Whatever 
notion did exist about him was usually distortion and caricature. Even 
in classic Russian literature the Jew appears either as an unreal being 
or as a ludicrous creature.”70  
Beyond the matter of Russian state forcibly separating Jews and 
non-Jews through the creation of the Pale of Settlement, the constant 
twists and turns of the government’s Jewish policy probably took 
quite a toll on relations between the two groups. Above all else, the 
state created a scenario with a moving target. No one ever quite knew 
where the Jews stood—except for at the top—or where they might be 
headed in the coming weeks and months. The constant back and forth 
likely transfixed society in a sort of perpetual unease regarding the 
Jewish Question. For example, Alexander II might take two steps 
forward with the partial emancipation of a select few Jews. But the 
backlash would arrive swiftly in the form of the Russian press running 
headlines that remarked “The Jew is on the Move” and Russian 
writers complaining about the number of Jews enrolled in the 
secondary and higher education system.71 Predictably, Alexander 
would have to change course once Christian pressure became too 
much, which obviously happened in this instance. The inability of the 
state to outline a specific policy—rather than opportunistically 
69  Klier, "Pale of Settlement." 
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jumping from issue to issue—created a situation where Russian-
Jewish relations were bound to fester then fail. 
Conclusion 
What this review of Russia’s policy toward Jews from the middle 
of the eighteenth century to the end of Alexander II’s reign 
demonstrates is the sheer complexity of the Jewish Question in the 
Russian Empire. Clearly no single motivation prompted Russia’s 
leaders to enact the various policies they passed during this period. 
On this point, Demidov’s theory misses the mark. The Russian noble 
claimed that the state’s consistent pursuit of economic enhancement 
served as the “main principle” underlying Russian legislation 
concerning Jews. After a complete and thorough examination of 
Russia’s policy, it remains unknown whether this impulse acted as the 
main principle when Russian officials they crafted the various pieces 
of legislation that affected Jews living in the empire. While the 
statutes and decrees that Demidov cites often blatantly speak about 
the government’s wish to derive economic benefits from the Jews 
from the configuration of its policies, the historian must also consider 
that officials frequently include certain language in documents to 
mask their actual intentions. This makes gleaning their actual 
meaning and motivations virtually impossible. Another matter to 
consider is that the Russian government framed its Jewish policies 
hoping to achieve several goals at the same time. Maybe it sought to 
protect the peasants from Jewish exploitation while concurrently 
gaining an economic advantage from the Jewish population. 
Determining where the aim of one part of the policy ends and another 
begins is another quandary capable of forever baffling the historian. 
With that said, overwhelming evidence exists to show that the 
Russian government hoped to craft policies during this period that 
would transform Jews into economically advantageous subjects for 
the empire. Even before the Polish Partitions, the state demonstrated a 
propensity to allow economic considerations to supersede traditional 
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forms of religious intolerance, which typically kept Jews outside the 
empire’s borders. However, when Jewish presence was determined 
beneficial at local fairs or settling the western and southern provinces, 
the Russian state suddenly felt compelled to relax such restrictions. 
Following the Polish Partitions, Russia’s policy toward Jews became 
more focused on how the state could gain from the new additions to 
the empire. Beginning with the Jewish Constitution of 1804, the 
Russian state sought to define Jewish usefulness. For the most part, 
this meant transferring Jews out of leasehold jobs such as tavern 
keeping and innkeeping and into more “useful” and “productive” 
occupations that would help Russia develop into an economic 
powerhouse capable of rivaling those in the West. Subsequent pieces 
of legislation such as the military conscription policy, reclassification 
and Alexander II’s easing of residence and occupation restrictions all 
separated “productive” and “non-productive” Jews in some 
capacity—rewarding the former while punishing the latter.  
All of this evidence is enough to prove that while the Russian 
state may not have attempted to answer the Jewish Question in 
exactly the manner Demidov proposes, the prospect of deriving 
economic benefits from Jews certainly influenced the decision-
making of officials when they crafted policies that affected Jews.  
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